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Functionalism According To Fodor And Searle
Measuring the IQ of Mind and Machine: an Examination of Functionalism as Represented by Fodor and Searle ~ Shanaree Sailor ~ Fodor begins his article on the mind-body problem with a review of the current theories of dualism and materialism. According to dualism, the mind and body are two separate entities with the body being physical and the mind being nonphysical. If this is the case, though, then there can be no interaction between the two. The mind could not influence anything physical without violating the laws of physics. The materialist theory, on the other hand, states that the mind is not distinct from the physical. In fact, supporters of the materialist theory believe that behavior does not have mental causes. When the materialist theory is split into logical behaviorism and the central-state identity theory, the foundation of functionalism begins to form. Logical behaviorism states that every mental feeling has the same meaning as an if-then statement. For example, instead of saying "Dr. Lux is hungry," one would say "If there was a quart of macadamia brittle nut in the freezer, Dr. Lux would eat it." The central-state identity theory states that a certain mental state equals a certain neurophysiological state. The theory works in a way similar to Berkeley’s representation of objects. Both mental states and objects are a certain collection of perceptions that together identify the particular state or object. Fodor develops the idea of functionalism by combining certain parts of logical behaviorism and the central-state identity theory. From logical behaviorism, Fodor incorporates the idea that mental processes can be represented by physical if-then statements. As such, behavior and mental causation are no longer distinct and unable to interact. Also, logical behaviorism provides a way for mental causes to interact with other mental causes. This, in turn, may result in a behavioral effect.... Please login to view comments from other users.
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